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Accountability in the East Asian Economic Miracle,
Crisis and Recovery
JOHN RITCHIE
Durham Business School, University of Durham, Durham City, UK
ABSTRACT Despite claims that accountability enables ‘good governance’ proper, its
specific origins, character and limitations are not yet fully clear. In order to explicate
the nature of accountability better this paper will, therefore, formulate and apply its
own comparative framework to the case of the East Asian economic miracle, crisis and
recovery in particular. In so doing it finds that, even when accountability emerged as a
mid-crisis issue that was dramatically reconfigured for any due recovery later, it was
not itself then sufficiently explicated for all the implications and consequences to be rea-
lized fully. Once it is explicated more fully, however, the further implications and conse-
quences of changing accountability for economic governance question precisely what is to
be expected from accountability per se.
KEY WORDS: Accountability, Economic governance, East Asia, Unrealized implications/
consequences
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explicate more about the nature of accountability in econ-
omic governance so that this becomes more intelligible critically as a result. By using its
own comparative accountability framework it particularly seeks to explain how East
Asia’s dramatically reconfigured accountability, following that region’s astounding
relative economic growth, uneven development and precipitate crisis before, had other
important implications and further consequences for its recovery. So far these may not
have become suitably intelligible, precisely because few have sufficiently identified,
questioned and challenged the nature of accountability itself.
An uninformed pursuit of greater accountability may fail to grasp what else its further
reconfiguration might effect. In any case, a number of different parties may well have their
own specialist agendas for pursuing both further transparency and accountability in
economic governance. As well as leading individual nation and also region states – the
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EU and its ongoing ‘Transparency Initiative’, for example – it has been observed that other
international organizations (Wellens 2001), especially emerging market-directed financial
organizations (Hanson 2003), have all lately come to seek further leverage over this, too.
In addition, multilateral organizations, such as the OECD (2002), along with the World
Bank (Schlemner-Schultz 2001) and the IMF (Lee 2002; Stiglitz 2003), have formally
addressed transparency and accountability issues. So, too, have various other would-be
‘best practice’/standard prescribing organizations (Graz 2003), key bond/credit rating
agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, and aspiring global accountancy
and management consultancy firms (King & Sinclair 2003), together with various other
campaign movements. Although each of these may put its own particular construction
upon it, accountability is nevertheless so much part of the very making of human
society itself that they appear partially selective constructions at best. Any further
debate, therefore, should not be straight-jacketed along what would seem to be mutually
exclusive, either/or accountable or else unaccountable type lines when the real issue
concerns what particular forms accountability necessarily can and might take, and how
these are best chosen and effected.
Developments across East Asia can here provide an illuminating test case of the remak-
ing of accountability in economic governance generally. The original grand narrative
itself – albeit one which has been variously ‘discursively deconstructed’ since
(Hall 2003) – typically depicted an East Asian economic miracle, crisis and recovery
where the importance of accountability apparently only emerged mid-crisis, to be made
increasingly imperative for any due recovery. However, this was not simply an issue of
compelling previously relatively unaccountable regimes to finally become more economi-
cally accountable, by means of due processes they had merely skirted before. It was also an
occasion for others to exercise the power and authority to effect different accountability
preferences upon societies which, in the accepted grand narrative of the time, had, until
then, successfully pursued different accountabilities. As a result, the social and political,
as well as economic and administrative, efficacy of reconfiguring their entire accountabi-
lity this way was highly loaded from the start. To understand this better it is first necessary
to explicate more about the very nature of accountability itself, and then outline how it was
so dramatically reconfigured over the entire East Asian economic miracle, crisis and
recovery.
Accountability Explicated
If accountability can be considered indispensable for the making of human society itself
then it is clearly most important to differentiate further all the different individual forms
it takes while also explaining how they might best fit certain types of society. So far,
the various distinct origins, characteristics and also limitations upon these different
accountabilities have not been explicated readily. In addition, contemporary social
science (see, for instance, Munro & Mouritsen 1996) has argued that accountability can
be constructed socially and politically to the effect of asserting one type of society over
another, for which reason accountability is never far removed from power and authority.
Certain recently proposed changes in economic governance incorporate preferences
which, themselves, reflect quite different bearings upon what ‘good governance’ should
be. The real efficacy of different accountabilities for economic governance cannot,
therefore, be realized fully unless the nature of accountability itself becomes explicated
better through being developed from a ‘tool’ to a ‘theory’ (Douglas and Ney 1998).
At present the study of accountability already cuts across a number of different academic
subject boundaries, while itself extending towards more academics (Strathern 2000),
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including researchers (Romm 2002), themselves. Issues of accountability are, therefore,
embraced within quite a number of different debates. It has often been linked closely
with the study of governance (Bovens 1998), even though this has not always been the
most stable articulating principle (Pierre 2000), despite prospectively encompassing
both its public and private orbits. Moving attention from governance towards particular
organizations and their management shows that accountability has gone beyond the orig-
inal envelope of ‘public administration’ into the ‘new public management’ (Guy & Dufour
2000; Wolf 2000) and beyond. At the same time it has variously embraced the discourses
of the new ‘managerial’ (Clarke & Newman 1997), ‘regulatory’ (Scott 2000), and ‘self-
restraining’ (Schedler et al. 1999) state. Where these become debated more critically,
accountability has accordingly been implicated further within such rising syndromes as
‘governing by numbers’ (Miller 2001), while ‘drowning by numbers’ (Fisher 2000),
depending upon whatever ‘regime of control’ the prevailing ‘audit society’ (Power
1997) would choose to impose. Similarly, while orthodox management theory has its
own distinct history, its early pathfinders put accountability and responsibility so
much at issue right from the start that both have since been radically rethought as a
result (Koestenbaum & Block 2001), as other campaign movements, such as ‘Social
Accountability’ would also call for.
All these different accountabilities clearly need to be specified suitably, framed and
rendered comparable with each other (Day & Klein 1987) before they, themselves,
become sufficiently explicable for our purposes here. By drawing upon other parallel
four-fold explanatory schemas, such as those derived from Douglas (1982) and
Fiske (1991), for example, it is possible to derive the core ideal-typical nature of these
accountabilities from a matrix of both vertical (i.e. rule) and horizontal (i.e. relational)
characteristics, as illustrated in Figure 1.
By thus differentiating their vertical from their horizontal, and also stronger- and
weaker-held characteristics, Types 1 and 2 are revealed to be the more formally extant
and Types 3 and 4 the more personal and socially diffuse forms of accountability,
respectively. As the most taken-for-granted, and also voluntaristic, form of accountability,
Type 3 has long underscored much personally close, family, kin, friendship and related
Figure 1. Ideal-typical forms of accountability. Source: Ritchie and Richardson (2000: 454).
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peer group interaction, without necessarily attracting very much notice itself. When it does
attract more attention as a form of accountability, for example through being either verti-
cally (by adding more rules) or horizontally (by incorporating other groups/outgroups)
realigned, this type becomes less voluntarily acceptable through either compromising
the required personal closeness through impersonal rule-making, or else becoming
increasingly sociocentric accountability instead. Any honour and shame attached is then
made public should this convert over into Type 4 accountability, where honour signifies
due affirmation, dishonour integrity lost (Stewart 1994) and shame stigmatic exposure
on an increasing scale (Scheff 2000). In particular, these appear in the practice of ‘account-
ing at the margins’ (Miller 1998; Ritchie & Richardson 2000), which can invoke both
honour and shame when, for instance, it becomes questionable whether promised trans-
actions between different parties can be ‘honoured’, knowing full well what particular
stigma either insolvency, bankruptcy and other deliberate ‘shaming of corporations’-
type tactics (Skeel 2001) might otherwise invoke. However, while most pursue Type 4
through diffuse social networks, formally extant Type 1 accountability is exacted
through rule-making hierarchies, which, themselves, bring other organizational consider-
ations to bear (Jaques 1976; Du Gay 2000), including dutiful indifference towards
whatever falls outside their formal jurisdiction (Herzfeld 1992). If more relational ground-
ing is required, Type 1 may then give way to Type 2 accountability wherever it appears
better ‘fitted’ for more specific purposes, provided that neither undue rule dominance
and/or relational incongruence then come to dominate instead.
At the same time, few accountabilities occur alone, while most continue to move in
and out of ‘fit’ with their surroundings. Most, indeed, overlap and recombine together
into dominant overall configurations that can vary according to different societal prefer-
ences precisely because few accountabilities enjoy unqualified universal appeal whatever
the society concerned. The question, therefore, arises: just how societally specific, malle-
able and/or transferable are certain leading configurations likely to be, given their
supposed importance for ‘good governance’ proper? If the societies concerned already
consider themselves reasonably alike, then interchangeable accountabilities would seem
less problematic, although not even the original ‘convergence thesis’ (Kerr 1983) antici-
pated complete convergence, as recent restatements (Pollitt 2001a; 2001b) emphasize.
In addition, ‘divergent capitalisms’ (Whitley 1999) – including both Eastern and
Western European, as well as US and East Asian variations – themselves question
who leads and follows any one selected accountability ethos. In due course, a comparative
‘business systems’ approach, more adapted towards ‘developing societies’ (Jacobsen &
Torp 2001), could well explore the issues of convergent and divergent accountabilities
further. Any growing cross-overs between transnational business and international
production/commodity chains (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994), together with supraterri-
torial diasporas and ‘transnational classes’, will further complicate such matters. The
multiple different accountabilities that ‘recombinant property’ displayed within so-called
transitional economies have likewise brought intermediate configurations to light as well
(Stark 1996; 2001). On further examination of East Asian development, it was evident that
the remaking of accountability itself was likewise dependent upon whether either an
economic miracle, crisis or recovery was dominant at the time.
Reprising East Asia’s Developmental Breakthrough
Recent developments across East Asia have been considered to be a successive miracle,
crisis and recovery, whereby the flaws in its original economic breakthrough were
brought to account before better governance was sought to ensure stable progress
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ahead. At the same time such reconfigured accountability latterly served certain political
and economic purposes more than others, whereas accountability had not really been part
of the lexicon of any original economic miracle before. The popular idea of an economic
miracle, indeed, implied that this was something extraordinary beyond expectation, which,
just by virtue of being a miracle, lay beyond previously available explanation as well
(Ritchie 1994). Once this particular economic miracle went into crisis, however, account-
ability became increasingly important and imperative for due recovery later.
Thus, that miracle, crisis and recovery are better reprised together, in their entirety,
rather than as individually separate phases apart, granted that even the earlier (South
East) ‘Asian Drama’ (Myrdal 1965) had already illustrated how drama-laden this
region’s entire economic performance could prove. Indeed, previously there had been
different economic miracle claims about Mainland China (Ritchie 1997), while economic
crises were still conventionally considered to be mere one-off aberrations from ‘normal’
market equilibrium elsewhere (Perelman 1999). It is, nevertheless, useful to consider
the character of economic miracle claims before reprising these dramatic East Asian
developments further. As well as overturning previously accepted wisdom, these
miracle claims challenged alternative explanations about economic performance, particu-
larly through their ‘high conviction’ as opposed to ‘high reliability’ based form of argu-
mentation, which can be difficult to engage on anything other than its own set terms
(Ritchie 1999). Only if one deciphers how miracle claims become constituted thus, as
well as what it is that they actually claim, are they likely to be suitably engaged and,
then, challenged critically. In principle, any economic miracle should occur on an excep-
tionally dramatic public scale, itself obtained through unique organizational processes that
might not have been anticipated before. To be more specific, it should first publicly drama-
tize an increasingly economically active society, whose forward momentum thereafter
requires decidedly pro-economic governance, to bring about near-simultaneous transform-
ation/dissolution of a new and old order, as championed by those movements which make
this their chosen cause. These are, nevertheless, the outcomes of unique organizational
processes which bind developing enterprise cultures with rising organizational births/
rebirths, fronted by emerging entrepreneurial classes and popularly recognized miracle
workings/workers themselves. Only when these particular processes are then linked
into such dramatic outcomes will most economic miracle claims become sufficiently
convincing for the necessary sense of transformation to take hold. If such claims only
convince in terms of outcomes alone they will lack suitable organizational grounding;
if only organizationally grounded they will lack sufficiently dramatic scale and scope
instead. In either case, the resulting gaps and inconsistencies expose such claims to the
kind of doubt and incomprehension that undermines the very faith that otherwise sustains
miraculous belief in them.
In effect, the grand narrative of an East Asian economic miracle purported to rewrite
an entire paradigm of economic history in its own right (Jones 1981; Frank 1998). It
asserted that, as well as regaining their historic ascendancy, East Asia’s increasingly econ-
omically active societies would outperform most others while also raising millions from
actual/near poverty at the same time. Other best-of-all-worlds-type scenarios also
implied that East Asian cultural equilibrium would not be disturbed by this process
because ‘Asian values’ would prove integral to, and not just dispensations of, the material
transformations already under way. For that reason East Asian societies would modernize
themselves more organically and with less detrimental costs than their Western counter-
parts had managed before (Beng-Huat 1999; Thompson 2001), so that any economic
miracle could be accomplished quicker, better and with more cultural congruency by
comparison. Of all the different versions that this ‘success story’ went through, perhaps
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the World Bank (1993) study conferred most official recognition upon this ‘East Asian
Development Model’ as the key economic miracle of its time. This study claimed that,
for example, by ‘getting the fundamentals right’, while still achieving exceptional
‘growth with equity’, this model was very well balanced, with no particular crisis then
in sight. The dramatic scale of the transformations then claimed still overshadowed
detailed understanding about leading East Asian organizational processes, however.
However, while some observers simply debated whether these transformations were
either primarily state or market led, others who had earlier identified ‘ersatz’ and
‘crony’ capitalist syndromes (Yoshihara 1988; Clad, 1989; Daly and Logan 1989;
Backman, 1999) would ironically find these syndromes became leading public culprits
for the crisis itself.
Realizing Accountability Under Crisis
Because the very idea of crisis has itself been somewhat ambiguously conceived and used
rather loosely before (Holton 1987), it is necessary to keep its application here under
critical scrutiny. In actuality, a different sense of crisis had already underscored wider
Asian economic performance before (Myrdal 1965), which could well have led some to
consider its later breakthrough relatively miraculous as a result. Although the idea of
this subsequent ‘Asian crisis’ soon slipped into everyday usage, and supplementary
descriptors like Asian ‘flu’, ‘sickness’ and ‘migraine’ all popularly signified what type
of outgroup these economies had then become, it was not always sufficiently interrogated
at the time, so that related understandings were invariably skewed (Ritchie 2001). To be
sure it was quickly, if somewhat uncritically, designated to be an economic, if not outright
financial, crisis from the start, but only with the consequence that certain social and poli-
tical characteristics were segregated out, as if they were just incidental accompaniments
of any ‘real’ crisis itself. As a result, more attention was directed arguably towards the
capitalistic framing of East Asian economic activities rather than what those activities
themselves actually were (Hamilton 1999).
As East Asian economies then became popularly ring-fenced, some began dissembling
their former pro-miracle arguments and not even the encouragement to re-designate it
an economic downturn, growth interruption, transitional readjustment, or disequilibrium
corrective could obscure the oscillations that took place. Indeed, the IMF at first found
it difficult to acknowledge this to be a crisis, fearing that such express acknowledgement
would, itself, invite further shockwaves, as did others, such as the EU (Bridges 1999;
Lee 2000). At the time, both the IMF and the World Bank already publicly subscribed
to particular accountability preferences, to which certain critics believed they themselves
did not necessarily adhere to (Harper 1998; 2000; Fox & Brown 1998). Close
first-hand observation of the IMF at the time suggested it became seized with its own
internal ‘organizational shock’ as events were then unfolding (Burstein 2001). To the
extent that certain key East Asian states considered that the IMF’s possible misreading
of their situation actually compounded their own rising problems, this also became
known as the ‘IMF crisis’.
When the more accepted explanation of an ‘Asian crisis’ did take hold, it was first
considered a one-off occurrence apart with its own distinct historical niche and clear
beginning and end to the course it would follow. A number of neat matter-of-fact chrono-
logies of key events at the time later implied that it was possible to be unequivocal about
where, when and how any such crisis first began, and what immediately followed, even if
its actual ending could not be determined. It became the accepted wisdom that, having
begun within Thailand in 1997, the crisis then seized other so-called ‘Tiger Cub’ and, in
96 J. Ritchie
the case of South Korea, ‘Tiger’ economies as well, with ‘Asian contagion’ confusing
matters further. Subsequent explanations for what then happened partly rested upon
what authorial perspective they employed, granted that convention already held that
creditors would be the first to author the debtors’ story. If some states and institutions
outside East Asia, indeed, considered they were obliged to ‘bail in’ to its required
‘rescue’, the case of Malaysia at least challenged accepted wisdom. Instead, its ‘economic
nationalist’-type challenge over the astounding currency fluctuations, capital flight,
portfolio investment withdrawals, and bank runs, defaults, and credit crunches of the
immediate time held outsiders most responsible – ‘international financial speculators’
included. In cases where it was considered to be more than just a financial (currency
and/or liquidity based) crisis, the morality of wider world economic power and authority
was questioned and different accountability was then called for. Given all the different
institutional forces at work (Henderson 1999), certain accepted explanations for – and
also detailed chronologies of – this crisis later appear just too simple, particularly
when Mainland China’s pre-1997 economic realignments (Fernald et al. 1999), the
earlier Japanese ‘bubble’ and the 1980’s neo-liberal ‘big bang’ financial deregulation
were also taken into consideration.
Towards Accountable Recovery
A crisis that arose from not comprehending fully the economic breakthrough, thus,
compelled more accountable recovery as a result. Even related statistical time series
data were then produced as if economic performance could be sharply divided between
breakthrough and crisis periods, respectively. However, while this reflected the prevailing
tendency to isolate and ring-fence any crisis and, thereby, regard it as a one-off occurrence,
further debate became bound up increasingly with recovery. At the same time, account-
ability was being reconfigured along such different lines that this also requires further
explanation.
To appreciate the particular reconfiguration decided upon, and explain how that choice
was made, the different prospective accountabilities can be considered from four specific
subtexts concerning recovery, hereafter termed the (free) market equilibrium, policy
management, institutional learning, and redress strategies, respectively. Despite their
simplicity, these strategies can still yield further insights into the choices made and
what they each inscribed upon recovery. For these purposes each individual strategy
can be considered to occupy a different position on one single continuum representing
how the case for any specific kind of accountability might have been argued for
hypothetically. At one end of that continuum the case to be argued would have been
frontloaded (that is, those particular factors would count most, compared with all the
others which might have been considered) in expressly economic and financial terms,
with social and political factors at the other end. The market equilibrium argument
was, therefore, frontloaded most economically and financially, whereas, at the other
end, the redress strategy was the most social and political, with policy management
and institutional learning occupying intermediate positions between them both. By
grasping this, it is possible to understand and explain the actual preference for market
equilibrium with reference to the reasoning behind it, especially compared with what
these other strategies prescribed instead.
Recovery through market equilibrium implied reframing East Asia’s entire economic
and financial readjustment to wider market forces, whereas the desiderata of policy
management exceeded market-based parameters. Because institutional learning
placed less significance on economic and financial factors, in principle it also embraced
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other state-, business-, production-, consumption-related considerations, while redress
sought renewed East Asian leadership above all. Given that market equilibrium was
most officially preferred, further policy management also called for wider macro-regional
economic and financial reform (Petri 2001). Institutional learning additionally looked
towards, for example, IMF, World Bank, APEC, ASEAN (Drysdale 2000) and corporate
governance reforms (Legewie & Meyer-Ohle, 2000; Kotler & Kartajaya 2000), while
redress insisted upon an ‘Asian recovery’. As a result, market equilibrium proposed
changing accountability for economic and financial reasons, thereby sidelining alternative
concerns about more accountable civil society, justice, democracy, media freedom and the
right to organize, for example. It sought to loosen markets from close East Asian ties and
obligations and would also oblige states and governments to reduce their ‘market
distorting’ involvements, especially those that made required economic and financial
information less transparent, the flow of which was already constrained through
inadequate accountancy, itself (Rahman 1998). The 2001 Economist ‘Survey of Asian
Business’ at the time expressed this in terms of being ‘in praise of rules’, where too
many states and governments had been like ‘empires without umpires’ before, although
those with particular ASEAN and APEC affiliations already found increasing transparency
itself difficult (Ravenhill 2001). In effect, certain East Asian networks would, thus,
become increasingly disembedded from those close mutual relationships which might
inhibit freer markets from achieving equilibrium conditions, even where, ironically,
these relationships might have been held co-responsible for the miracle breakthrough
before. The near-simultaneous disclosure of still other economic crises emerging within
Eastern Europe and elsewhere nevertheless raised other policy management-type
issues, while the institutional learning strategy emphasized other social and political
dimensions as well. In drawing attention to how well institutions like the IMF were
organized and managed for the task, and what else they needed to learn from these critical
episodes, the institutional learning strategy foreshadowed growing criticism within East
Asia, to which the redress strategy gave active voice. While institutional learning was a
dual purpose strategy that would both enable East Asian recovery while also pursuing
outside reforms, redress implied being much more partisan regarding the alleged
intrusion, corrosive regimes, aggressive social class struggles, worker-community
repression and similar ‘off balance sheet’ syndromes also considered to precipitate this
crisis and other uneven development before (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg 2000). The
redress strategy further doubted whether more transparent economic and financial
accountability could alone effect a truly ‘Asian recovery’ unless it also addressed these
social and political issues first. It particularly feared that such accountability would
merely disclose more valuable competitive secrets to others outside, especially to those
who might then gain control over selected East Asian business assets at much depreciated
‘knock down’ or ‘fire sale’ rates. It, therefore, insisted that East Asian societies needed to
recover from more than short term, or even primarily economic and financial, crisis alone,
for which reason it would compel greater social and political accountability proper.
The particular implications and consequences of each of these different strategies can
be illustrated briefly with specific reference to South Korea. In this case, few immediately
questioned its newly conferred status as East Asia’s star recovering economy when near
double-digit annual GDP figures were first made public. Although its impending default
was equally dramatic, others outside quickly assumed that IMF (and World Bank) ‘super-
vision’ had enabled this remarkable turnaround despite considerable criticism within
South Korea itself. As a one-time ‘hermit nation’ for whom traditionally ‘transparency
is hell’ (Alford 1999), South Korea had first become ‘Asia’s Next Giant’ (Amsden
1989) with such limited outside cultural exposure that its accountability might always
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have been potentially problematic. To be held more accountable through the IMF in view
of this crisis was itself deemed tantamount to a ‘national shame and humiliation’ for South
Korean society which might even put its entire sovereignty at risk. Thus, in then mapping
South Korean’s recovery, the preferred market equilibrium strategy prescribed near-
‘paradigmatic change’ towards a new market-led order (Jwa 2001); policy management
emphasized the importance of central tripartite state/big business/organized labour pacts,
in addition to meeting IMF ‘structural-readjustment’ conditionality; institutional
learning argued further that customary South Korean ‘deep finance’ (Biggart 1998) and
so-called ‘mafioso state’ manoeuvres (Oh 1999) could still privilege the leading chaebols
unless they were held more accountable socially and politically; while the redress strategy
held that South Korea’s forced transnationalization, diminished sovereignty, continuing
social class conflicts and, sometimes, social and political repression, could still obstruct
true recovery (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett 2000).
Discussion
If an increasing number of pronouncements by states, governments, multilateral/inter-
national organizations, and also corporate/special interest campaign groups are to be
believed, accountability has lately been moved towards the centre of ‘good governance’
proper. In some cases – the IMF and World Bank included – this has been partly in
response to events like those just outlined. It is now necessary to reinterpret those same
events using the theoretical framework proposed for the specific purpose of explaining
why, and with what effect, accountability then changed (Figure 1). Of course, if it is
the case that societies may converge together over certain matters while still diverging
about others, accountability gets caught up in the middle of a dilemma about its true affilia-
tion, especially where its global standardization is proposed. The whole East Asian case
would suggest that few may yet fully grasp all accountability’s diverse forms, implications
and consequences, including the synergies, trade-offs and syndromes that occur when
different accountabilities must combine together. The case, indeed, suggests that no one
specific ‘type’ of accountability itself proved overwhelmingly problematic; the appropri-
ate configuration was more at the heart of many issues raised. This is not to be explained
through broad-brush overarching categories such as East–West differences alone (Beeson
2001; Prakash 2001), especially if East Asian societies themselves converge regarding the
idea of responsibility while diverging about accountability itself (Velayutham 1999) and
their ruling regimes resist rival arguments like those which Krugman (1994) originally
advanced.
All this begs the question of why the crisis initially left East Asia’s previous account-
ability so critically exposed, as if there had been untold ‘black holes’ in accounts of the
miracle before. The main lines of thought about economic crises might categorize
briefly these into the local/transient, cyclic/episodic, serial/systemic, and fuzzy/
reverberative types, respectively. As defined here, a local/transient crisis only occurs
relatively randomly in isolation, whereas a cyclic/episodic type arises in sequence to
the extent that, should it ever escalate into the sort of serial/systemic crisis that in
Marxian terms is considered to be inherent within capitalism itself, it may threaten to
become terminally unmanageable. By contrast, the fuzzy/reverberative type arises
more randomly and is less well embedded, bearing less predictable outcomes as a
result. At first, the East Asian crisis appeared so local/transient to isolated individual
economies, such as Thailand in 1997, that, for public purposes, it was accounted for
very straightforwardly, at least until ‘Asian contagion’ took hold. At that point, selected
cyclic/episodic characteristics were also observed, sometimes extending back into
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China’s prior economic repositioning and also Japan’s earlier economic ‘bubble’. At the
time when the crisis actually peaked, it was also feared that the region’s startling exposure
might escalate into a serial/systemic crisis outside. Given such different understandings
about the crisis itself it was not, then, surprising that it was also considered to be an emer-
gently fuzzy/reverberative crisis as well.
The effects of being chosen under ongoing crisis conditions also worked themselves
through into the different accountability then sought. The resulting choice of accountabi-
lity was, thus, inscribed with a selective diagnosis of East Asian accountability’s previous
failings, as well as the changed accountability being sought. In terms of the comparative
framework here, the most frontline crisis-afflicted states, such as Thailand, Indonesia and
South Korea, for example, were together judged excessively beholden unto narrowly
native-bound Type 3 and, sometimes, also Type 4, relational accountability, so that
they could not meet so-called new ‘international standards’ that called for better vertical
accountability in economic governance. On the basis of that diagnosis, the required recon-
figuration of East Asian accountability sought increasing lawful rule-based Type 1,
together with appropriately standardized, Type 2 accountability. An example of the
supposed failings which its customary Type 3 accountability otherwise brought was the
limited control over key national family and dynastic e´lites beyond that exerted through
their existing personal circle. A further example of Type 4 related failings was represented
to be key East Asian networks’ own supposedly semi-exclusive, ‘anti-competitive’
closed/close ownership ties, mutual alliances and self-protective arrangements which
enhanced other ‘state and market failure’ to change before crisis struck.
To grasp what such increasing Type 1 accountability implied, it is useful to consider
East Asia’s further legalization proper, since lawfully coded rules would henceforward
become increasingly important, and certain frontline crisis-afflicted states’ subsequent
globalization strategy virtually compelled it (Harding 2002). Outside those frontline
states, both Japanese and Chinese legal systems still differed (Mattei 1997), while
Offshore Chinese family business networks right across the region had customarily pre-
ferred Type 3 accountability (Winn 1994). With its much cited ‘shame culture’, Japan
had seen more Type 4 ‘name and shame’ accountability exacted over its aberrant bank
and finance officials following the ‘bubble’ before. But any pressures brought to bear
upon Japan to become more fully Type 1/2 accountable for wider regional recovery
could have less future significance than those concerning China. Although not a frontline
crisis-afflicted state itself, China’s position has appeared blurred through limited transpar-
ency and accountability. Its continuing realignment with the wider world economy
and protracted WTO entry process, has brought more official pronouncements about
both, yet some observers remained sceptical (Vermeer & D’Houghe 2001), even when
the SARS outbreak first occurred. In this and other matters it is necessary to recognize
that East Asian accountability is still in flux, however, despite it becoming increasingly
codified outside (Soederberg 2003). Such codes may require close empirical scrutiny
(see, for example, Drabeck & Payne 2002; Rodan, 2002; Zhao et al. 2003) if the claims
of both transparency and accountability to enable ‘good governance’ are to prove justified
in future.
Conclusions
The study of economic governance today directs particular attention towards accountabi-
lity itself. However, despite being deemed increasingly imperative for ‘good governance’
proper, accountability has not yet been well enough comprehended for all its different
origins, meanings, implications and consequences to be sufficiently clear and explicable.
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So, despite being an increasingly required and, sometimes, even obligatory means for
leveraging ‘good governance’, most notably by supposedly disclosing true performance
better, accountability has not itself been suitably revealed. However, once its own
construction has been made clear, actual accountability can become more questionable
and less imperatively constituted, as a result. So, just when more required accountability
should supposedly diffuse across different governance regimes, its own distinct origins,
character and limitations stand exposed. This paper uses its own comparative framework
for the purposes of understanding and explaining how different accountabilities were
reconfigured together across the entire East Asian economic miracle, crisis and recovery.
It recounts how, having first been very differently constituted for the original economic
miracle, accountability was then critically realized during the subsequent crisis and then
dramatically reconfigured for due recovery since. It explains how the different origins,
character and limitations, as well as other affiliations of such reconfigured accountability,
had further implications and consequences which were not fully anticipated, but which
could become more apparent hereafter.
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